Tuesday, October 19, 2004
Fareed Zakaria addresses the missing issue
Most serious analysts (especially in the economic realm) in America have begun to acknowledge the emergence of China and India as alternative engines to the world economy. In fact, by some PPP measures, China accounted for one-third or more of world economic growth in the past few years. However, the story of the economic emergence of these these countries (and the accompanying geo-political shifts) has been completely avoided in the political space, except when John Kerry wants to take a swipe at outsourcing. The first debate was ostensibly about foreign policy and yet, neither Lehrer nor the candidates thought it worthwhile to discuss the foreign policy implications of the changing economic landscape. Fareed Zakaria analyses this very issue in an op-ed written in today's Washington Post.
There have been two great shifts in the international balance of power over the past 500 years. The first was the rise of Western Europe, which by the late 17th century had become the richest, most dynamic and expansionist part of the globe. The second was the rise of the United States of America, which between the Civil War and World War I became the single most important country in the world. Right now a trend of equal magnitude is taking place: the rise of Asia, led by China, which will fundamentally reshape the international landscape in the next few decades. For the United States, whether it is preserving jobs or security, recognizing and adapting to this new world order is key.
From computer science to biotechnology, one can see the beginnings of Asian science. It's at a very early stage, but again, the arrow is moving in only one direction. Physical Review, a top science journal, notes that the number of papers it publishes by Americans has been falling dramatically, from 61 percent of the total in 1983 to 29 percent last year. The journal's editor told the New York Times that China, which now submits 1,000 a year, has sharply increased its share of the total.
With economic growth comes cultural confidence and political assertiveness. The West has long taken Asia for granted, seeing it as an investment opportunity or a stage where Great Power rivalries could be played out, as in Vietnam and Korea. But this too will change. China and India are both proud and ancient civilizations. They also have large internal economies, not totally dependent on exports to the West. (In the wake of the East Asian crisis of 1997, all the East Asian tiger economies collapsed. But China and India grew solidly, even when demand from the West dried up.) This rise of confidence is just beginning -- it's clearly visible in trade negotiations -- and will only grow with time.
The war on terrorism is crucial; winning in Iraq is necessary; Middle East peace is important. But I wonder whether, as we furiously debate these matters in America, we resemble Englishmen in the waning days of the British Empire. They vigorously debated the political and military situation in remote areas such as Iraq, Afghanistan and Sudan (some things don't change). They tried mightily, and at great cost, to stabilize disorderly parts of the globe. Meanwhile, across the Atlantic, the United States was building its vast economic, technological and cultural might, which was soon to dominate the world.
There have been two great shifts in the international balance of power over the past 500 years. The first was the rise of Western Europe, which by the late 17th century had become the richest, most dynamic and expansionist part of the globe. The second was the rise of the United States of America, which between the Civil War and World War I became the single most important country in the world. Right now a trend of equal magnitude is taking place: the rise of Asia, led by China, which will fundamentally reshape the international landscape in the next few decades. For the United States, whether it is preserving jobs or security, recognizing and adapting to this new world order is key.
From computer science to biotechnology, one can see the beginnings of Asian science. It's at a very early stage, but again, the arrow is moving in only one direction. Physical Review, a top science journal, notes that the number of papers it publishes by Americans has been falling dramatically, from 61 percent of the total in 1983 to 29 percent last year. The journal's editor told the New York Times that China, which now submits 1,000 a year, has sharply increased its share of the total.
With economic growth comes cultural confidence and political assertiveness. The West has long taken Asia for granted, seeing it as an investment opportunity or a stage where Great Power rivalries could be played out, as in Vietnam and Korea. But this too will change. China and India are both proud and ancient civilizations. They also have large internal economies, not totally dependent on exports to the West. (In the wake of the East Asian crisis of 1997, all the East Asian tiger economies collapsed. But China and India grew solidly, even when demand from the West dried up.) This rise of confidence is just beginning -- it's clearly visible in trade negotiations -- and will only grow with time.
The war on terrorism is crucial; winning in Iraq is necessary; Middle East peace is important. But I wonder whether, as we furiously debate these matters in America, we resemble Englishmen in the waning days of the British Empire. They vigorously debated the political and military situation in remote areas such as Iraq, Afghanistan and Sudan (some things don't change). They tried mightily, and at great cost, to stabilize disorderly parts of the globe. Meanwhile, across the Atlantic, the United States was building its vast economic, technological and cultural might, which was soon to dominate the world.
